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ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
INTRODUCTION
"As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants
are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when com-
pared with wire-tapping."'
Technological advances in wire-tapping and other forms of eaves-
dropping have had a significant effect upon constitutional rights. The
devices available to the eavesdropper have given him an almost incon-
ceivable ability to encroach upon the privacy of communication. Micro-
phones too small to detect are sensitive enough to pick up every sound
within a house, and tiny transmitters may be concealed in the lining of a
coat, in a picture on a wall, or inside a telephone.2 A telephone in New
York may be tapped at will by using a second phone in Los Angeles to
secretly actuate a small device previously installed inside the New York
phone.3 Installation of some of these devices does not require entry-a
"spike mike" may be driven through a common wall.4 Wires, when
needed, may be specially painted on any surface and then concealed under
a coat of ordinary paint.5 There seemingly is no limit to what the sound
engineer can construct to fit a particular situation.6 Even more fright-
ening is a parabolic microphone which under ideal conditions can pick
up a conversation at a distance of one thousand feet, and a microwave
beam now being perfected, which would be capable of penetrating any
structure and returning every word spoken inside.7 The development and
perfection of such devices poses problems which must be confronted and
resolved by the legislature or the courts in order to prevent further
erosion of the right of privacy.
Wire-tapping is included in the broader terms of eavesdropping or
electronic surveillance. Eavesdropping includes all form of surreptitious
fact finding which may intrude on individual privacy.8 This comment
will analyze current restrictions on electronic surveillance under statute
and case law, define the right which is to be protected, and explore new
approaches to this area. Using as a foundation current and proposed
legislation, a group of eavesdropping statutes for Montana will be sug-
gested.
EXTENT AND USEFULNESS
Wire-tapping began shortly after the telegraph came into existence,
'Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS 341-42 (1959). The DASH
study is the most extensive in the field, and is reviewed at 44 MINN. L. REv. 813-940
(1960), in a symposium titled The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: Reflections
on the Eavesdroppers.
WNational Broadcasting Corporation special report, The Big Ear, televised October 31,
1965. Such devices are difficult to detect.
'This procedure was followed in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
'DASH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 316-17.
'N.B.C. special report, supra note 3. According to the report, eavesdropping in the
Southern California area has become so widespread that some attorneys hire experts
to search for "bugs" once every month.
'DASH, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 346-58. However, such equipment would be bulky and
very expensive.
'Eavesdropping is not a new problem. "Eavesdroppers, or such as listen under walls
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and is now practiced throughout the United States.9 Tapping has oc-
curred most frequently in the city of New York where state law per-
mits it under court order. City attorneys have testified that approxi-
mately 480 taps per year were installed in their jurisdictions for the
investigation of larceny, vice, and official corruption.' 0 Mr. Justice
Douglas claims that there were 52,000 wire taps in New York in 1952,
counting both legal and illegal installations." Another authority claims
that in the same year there were 13,000 to 26,000 taps.1 2 The majority
of wire-tap orders were obtained in vice investigations. 3 Eavesdropping
other than by wire-tap is probably conducted on a much wider scale, but
no statistics are available.
In contrast to the sensational activities of private investigators and
police, respectable businessmen have quietly installed their own surveil-
lance devices for purposes of internal security. Closed circuit television
enables personnel to maintain a watch for possible shoplifting, and
phones are tapped to detect pilfering and disloyalty. Two-way mirrori
are common, as well as concealed microphones, in rooms which the pub-
lic is invited to use. 14 The conversations of public officials in all sorts
of government agencies, bureaus, and political subdivisions have been
monitored.' 5 Training centers for instructing wire-tapping are in opera-
tion under various sponsorships.' 6
or windows, or the eaves of a house, to harken after discourse . . . were subject
to prosecution at the common law if the offense was habitual. 4 BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES, ch. 13, § 5 (Lewis ed. 1900).
'Wire-tapping was widespread during the Civil War, and California enacted a statute
prohibiting it in 1862. New York police were tapping telephones by 1895, as were
unions and competing businesses. In 1929, Mayor Walker of New York City dis-
covered that seventeen telephone lines serving city hall and his direct line to police
headquarters had been tapped. An F.C.C. raiding party found wiretap equipment
connected to the telephone lines of U.S. Supreme Court justices in 1935 or 1936, and
during the same period the White House lines were also tapped. See DASH, Op. cit.
supra note 2, at 24-30. The most sensational wiretap scandal broke in 1955 when
New York police unearthed a wire-tapping headquarters capable of intercepting
conversations over one hundred thousand telephones. The New York Times, February
18, 1955; DASH, op. cit. 8upra note 2, at 84-86.
10DASH, op. cit. upra note 2, at 41.
"DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 355 (1955); DASH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 40.
U1 MINN. L. REv., supra note 2, at 819.
"DASH, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 42. Police use of surveillance devices is more frequent
in connection with less serious and continuing offenses such as vice. See Kent,
Wiretapping: Morality and Legality, 2 Hous. L. REV. 285, 288 (1965). There is some
question whether gambling is a serious enough offense to justify the invasion of
privacy, but police feel that gamblers are but the fringe of the hardeore underworld.
See MINN. L. REv., suprat note 2, at 843. A serious problem exists as to vice wire-
tapping, in that police corruption often follows, and there have been several instances
where plainclothesman were found to be "shaking down" the gamblers. DASH, Op.
cit. supra note 2, at 57-62; Kent, supra note 13, at 289-90.
"Car dealers-i-the Los Angeles area have concealed microphones in "closing rooms"
where prospective customers are left alone to reveal how far they will go towards
the purchase of a new automobile. Id. at 96, 212.
'Westin, The Wire-tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52
COLUm. L. REv. 165, 167 (1952). Eavesdropping is practiced by the F.B.I. in con-
nection with loyalty probes. There have been complaints that lines at the United
Nations have been under surveillance, and it is common knowledge that foreign
embassy staffs have been victims of electronic surveillance.
"Id. at 168.
[Vol. 27,
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NOTES
Law enforcement agencies hesitate to prosecute private eavesdrop-
pers because the police themselves participate in illegal surveillance.
7
In many jurisdictions information obtained through surveillance is never
introduced into court, but used only as an investigative tool. Police
claim that such evidence panics lawyers and the community, resulting in
efforts to restrict eavesdropping. Also, such evidence jeopardizes a trial
because of the danger of technical arguments as to its source, which may
also obscure the real issue.18
IS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE NECESSARY?
Opponents of eavesdropping believe the practice to be an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy. Fear of a police state, always a public con-
cern, is also a cause of complaint. Although eavesdropping's nearest
relative, search and seizure, is permitted under restraints imposed by the
Constitution, electronic surveillance can not be so regulated, and is less
capable of being so restricted. Surveillance does not discriminate-
every one who uses a tapped line or speaks in a bugged room suffers an
invasion of privacy.1 9 Victims of surveillance can't object to the secret
intrusions because their assailants are unseen and unknown.
Continued eavesdropping by public officers, police departments, dis-
trict attorneys, and federal bureaus, has put these agencies on the de-
fensive against an inquisitive and alarmed public. Believing surveillance
to be vital to their work, law enforcers practice it, but in deference to
statutory restrictions, such activities are concealed. For this reason, ef-
forts to gather data as to the extent and usefulness of surveillance have
been resisted, constituting a roadblock to constructive legislation. Use
by the government of a method so generally detested may breed disre-
spect and distrust of the law. It is better that some offenders escape
criminal penalty than that the government blacken itself in this
manner.
20
The proponents of electronic surveillance recognize the inherent
dangers, but counter with two arguments: (1) the need is great, and
(2) these practices are no more sordid than other aspects of criminal
investigation. Many eminent authorities believe eavesdropping to be an
important and necessary investigative device. 2' To fail in its function, it
is argued, would bring the law into greater disrepute than to employ a
27MINN. L. REV., supra note 2, at 821-22.
8DASH, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 251.
"At present, auditory surveillance is a greater invasion of privacy, because of the
greater security from visual eavesdropping afforded by enclosed places; but in the
future walls may cease to be a barrier, and it will be the visual eavesdropper who
poses the greatest threat to individual privacy. See note, 52 CALP. L. REv. 142, 147
(1964).
2Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping-Part IV, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 73, 93 (1947).
oNote, 2 STAN. L. REv. 744, 751-52 (1950); MINN. L. REv., supra note 2, at 815-16,
822-23.
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method generally condemned.22 Eavesdropping is in the interests of the
nation. Its use is advocated for the detection of serious offenses such as
kidnapping and murder, and crimes against national security such as
sabotage and espionage. But these advocates have been unable to show
that tapping and bugging reduces such serious crimes. Electronic sur-
veillance is most helpful in detecting crimes of a continuing nature such
as gambling, prostitution, narcotics, and blackmail. The crimes of mur-
der or robbery, however, consist of a single act which is carried out, and
then not discussed further.
Electronic surveillance sometimes provides the critical proof of the
conspiratorial nature of a criminal act. Recordings may serve to con-
vince the defendants that police know of their guilt, and that they would
be wise to turn state's evidence. 23 Also, a recording is often the only
means of proving that a bribe has been offered.
It is also argued that electronic surveillance is no more of a dirty
business than search and seizure, police informers, and spies. Not all
police weapons can be morally immaculate. 24 Criminals utilize science to
the fullest in their schemes, and therefore law enforcers should also be
permitted the use of new devices. A complete ban on tapping and bug-
ging would allow criminals to further their schemes by telephone without
fear of police interception. A man who is clearly guilty should not be
allowed to escape punishment because the means used to discover his
crime and apprehend him were illegal.
A value judgment must be made between these sets of opposed
arguments. It is submitted that rigidly controlled surveillance should be
permitted. Since police corruption is a common occurrence when sur-
veillance is permitted in connection with vice investigation, enforcement
surveillance should be confined to the more serious crimes.25 A continu-
ing controversy also exists as to whether evidence obtained by illegal
eavesdropping should be admissible in court.26  The trend is towards
exclusion of all evidence so obtained, and the fruits of such information.
2Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at 91. J. Edgar Hoover has described wiretapping as
archaic and inefficient, and a barrier to sound, ethical, and scientific investigative
technique.
'Westin, supra note 15, at 195.
MWestin, supra note 15, at 187.
1It can be argued that invasions of privacy are more justifiable when a more serious
crime is involved.
"The arguments can be summarized as follows--Should be admitted: (1) exclusion
would violate the ancient rule that evidence is admissible .regardless of the means
used to obtain it; (2) such information is usually introduced in the permanent form
of tape or wire recordings-evidence is therefore the most reliable and accurate
obtainable, and thus of great value in determining guilt or innocence; (3) those
persons who eavesdrop contrary to statute should be punished directly by penal
statutes or an action for civil damages brought by the victim, not indirectly by
exclusion of valuable evidence so obtained; (4) rejection of relevant, though illegally
obtained evidence, will often lead to the freeing of dangerous criminals. Should be
excluded: (1) to admit illegally obtained evidence ratifies the act of the offending
officer--distrust of the law results from acceptance of the fruits of illegal acts;
(2) the right to be protected is so valuable as to justify the occasional release of a
criminal; (3) exclusion is the only practical means of enforcing eavesdropping
statutes, since penal sanctions are rarely invoked. See Rosenzweig, supra note 20, at
90, 95; and People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
[Vol. 27,
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NOTES
This has been found to be the only means of deterring law enforcement
officers and private individuals from violating statutory restrictions.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Confusion exists concerning the nature of the interest protected by
the right of privacy. The state of law in this area has been described as
"a haystack in a hurricane. '27 Warren and Brandeis, in their famous
essay, indicated that the protected interest is "the principle which pro-
tects personal writings and all other personal productions . . . against
publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private prop-
erty, but that of an inviolate personality. '28  (Emphasis added.) Prosser
suggests that privacy is a composite of the interests in reputation, emo-
tional tranquility and tangible property.2 9 Electronic surveillance is an
intrusion which demeans individuality and affronts personal dignity:
[O]ur Western culture defines individuality as including the right to
be free from certain types of intrusions. This measure of personal
isolation and personal control over the conditions of its abandonment
is of the very essence of personal freedom and dignity, is part of
what our culture means by these concepts. A man whose home may
be entered at the will of another, whose conversations may be over-
heard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies
may be overseen at the will of another, is less of a man, has less
human dignity, on that account. He who may intrude upon another
at will is the master of the other and in fact, intrusion is the primary
weapon of the tyrant.3 0
Unlike other torts, harm caused by intrusions on privacy is not dam-
age which may be repaired, and the loss suffered may not be made good
by an award of damages. 31
Constitutional considerations concerning the right of privacy have
revolved almost entirely around the Fourth Amendment. However, the
narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to date, and the con-
tinual analogy to search and seizure, renders the Fourth Amendment
inadequate in this area. Other constitutional sources of protection should
be cultivated.3 2 The Fifth Amendment was first mentioned by Brandeis
'Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 1956).
'Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAIV. L. REV. 193, at 205 (1890).
Brandeis, dissenting in Olnstead, supra note 1, at 478: "They [the makers of our
Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment."
9According to Prosser, privacy may be violated by four distinct types of torts: (1)
intrusions upon a person's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public
disclosure of embarassing private facts about a person; (3) publicity which places a
person in a false light in the public eye; (4) appropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the victim's name or likeness. For an intrusion to be actionable, it
must be something which would be objectionable or offensive to a reasonable man.
Prosser concludes that the interest protected is primarily a mental one. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALis. L. REv. 383, 392 (1960).
'Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 973-74 (1964).
t Id. at 1003.
IREvisED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 64-201 "Besides the personal rights mentioned
or recognized in this code, every person has, subject to the qualifications and
1966]
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in his dissent in Olmstead, but not seriously considered because the indi-
vidual was speaking voluntarily, even though unaware his statement was
being overheard. 3 However, in other settings an accused is informed of
his Fifth Amendment right before he is questioned. Since the Court is
moving towards a requirement that the individual be advised of all his
constitutional rights, it is likely that the Fifth Amendment may be em-
ployed to restrict electronic surveillance. 34
It has been argued that privacy is part of the liberty protected
against the federal government by the Due Process clause.35 Justice
Frankfurter once observed: "The security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment-is basic to free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the con-
cept of ordered liberty' . . . .36 In addition, a "right of silence" may
exist as one form of freedom of speech.37 The theory has been rejected by
the Court thus far, probably because of the difficulty of injecting a
"freedom from" claim into a concept that has always signified "freedor
to do." However, freedom of speech may be violated through the in-
hibitive effect of electronic surveillance .3 The Court has recognized that
indirect interference with First Amendment rights in effect violates
them.39
Privacy is being more fully defined by recent decisions of the
Supreme Court which extend far beyond electronic surveillance. Privacy
may be violated by several means. On the civil side, intrusions may be
restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily restraint or harm,
from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal relations."
The only case falling under this section is one of slander, but the statute could be
construed so as to protect privacy. (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are
cited R.C.M.)
0The defendant argued that the use as evidence of overheard conversations compelled
the defendant to be a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Taft, C.J., speaking for the majority, said: "There is no room in the present case
for applying the Fifth Amendment unless the Fourth Amendment was first violated.
There was no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their
many telephones. They were continually and voluntarily transacting business without
knowledge of the interception. Our consideration must be confined to the Fourth
Amendment." Olmstead, supra note 1, at 462.
"See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 375 U.S. 902 (1964).
3Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Washington, J., dis-
senting).
a1Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
which overruled Wolf, and imposed the exclusionary rule upon the states, would
seem to substantiate this theory.
TDouglas, J., expressed this view as to those who are asked to subscribe to official
oaths, and to witnesses appearing before legislative investigating committees who
refuse to answer questions which touch on their beliefs or the beliefs of their
friends. See DOUGLAS, RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 134 (1958): ''One great right pro-
tected by the First Amendment is the right of silence."
88"But freedom of speech is undermined where people fear to speak unconstrainedly
in what they suppose to be the privacy of the home and office . . . If electronic
surveillance by the government becomes sufficiently widespread, and there is little
prospect of checking it, the hazard that as a people we may become hagridden and
furtive is not fantasy." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Further, even loss of anonymity may discourage the exercise of
freedom of expression. See King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights:
Some Recent Developments and Observations, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 240, 267 (1964).
0E.j., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 6
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committed by the press, by landlords,40 for commercial purposes,41 and
most recently, by a state statute which prohibited the use of contracep-
tives by married couples.42 Criminal intrusions such as illegal search and
seizure and eavesdropping are more serious since incriminating evidence
is usually being sought. Electronic surveillance is the most serious intru-
sion of privacy since the victim is unaware his action are under surveil-
lance, and eavesdropping is much more pervasive and capable of a m-tch
deeper penetration into the individual's existence.
43
There are indications that privacy may be placed on a higher plane,
and thus be accorded special protection, as has been done with freedom
of speech, the right to vote, and the right of indigents to assigned coun-
sel. Should privacy be given special protection, eavesdropping will be
sharply curtailed, or perhaps prohibited altogether.
THE LAW
Most unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral
objections to established modes of conduct. They are unenforced
because we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed because
we want to preserve our morals. 44
In order to appreciate the problems which accompany any attempt
to place electronic surveillance within the Fourth Amendment or to for-
mulate new legislation, it is necessary to analyze the law as developed
by federal courts. Two main lines of authority exist in this area. Re-
strictions on wire-tapping have been imposed by statutory interpretation,
while restrictions on eavesdropping have until very recently been of a
constitutional nature.
Olmstead v. United States is the landmark case which begins the con-
stitutional history of electronic surveillance. In a 5-4 decision, the Su-
preme Court held that federal agents who had tapped the defendant's
telephone lines without a physical trespass had not violated the Fourth
or Fifth Amendments. 45 The majority sharply limited the scope of the
357 U.S. 449 (1958); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), rev'd on rehearing, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Grosjean v.
United States, 297 U.S. 233 (1935).
10The leading case in this area is Welsch v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816
(1952). At first privacy was accorded legal protection only in cases of actual
physical intrusion, but was later extended to include surveillance of the electronic
type. See Prosser, supra note 29, at 389-90. Three states have applied the same
principle to peering through the windows of a house. Moore v. New York Elevated
R. Co., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892); Pritchett v. Bd. of CommI'rs of Knox
County, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908); Sounder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88
So.2d 716 (La. App. 1956).
"Including public disclosure, use of name of likeness, false light, advertising, bill
collecting, pictures, and unfair competition. See Prosser, supra note 29.
aSee Griswold v. Connecticut, 389 U.S. 479 (1965).
"Eavesdropping by means of a listening device has been held to be an actionable
violation of one's right of privacy. See McDaniel v. Atlanta Coco-Cola Bottling Co.,
60 Ga. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939); Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564
(1958); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
"ARNOLD, SYMBOLS oF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935).
"Supra note 1. For an extended discussion of Olntead, see Beaney, The Constitutiona2
Bight to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUPREME COURT REvIEw 212, 218-28.
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Fourth Amendment by insisting that a trespass be committed before a
violation would be found.46 Further, the Court stated that conversation
is intangible, therefore incapable of seizure.47 Although not within the
scope of certiorari, the Court also held that no exclusionary rule applied
to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though
wire-tapping was forbidden by the state involved.48 Strong dissents were
delivered by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Butler and Stone. Justice Holmes
protested government use of evidence obtained through a criminal act,
and described wire-tapping as "dirty business. '49 Brandeis' classic and
powerful dissent put wire-tapping within the confines of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. Since the adoption of the two amendments, Brandeis
said: "subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made
it possible for the Government . . . to obtain disclosure in court of what
is whispered in the closet." 50 Reasoning that the two amendments were
intended to forbid any unwarranted invasions of individual privacy, he
concluded that the Fourth Amendment forbids interception of telephone
conversations, while the Fifth forbids information so obtained from be-
ing admissible as evidence. Although severely criticized at the time, the,
Olmstead decision did stimulate legislation, subsequent interpretation of
which strongly reflected Brandeis' influence.
Section 605
In 1934, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act. Section
605 provided in part: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person .... "'' (Emphasis added.) A major defect of
the statute is that both interception and divulgence are required before
there is a violation.
Nardone v. United States was the first case in which the Supreme
Court interpreted section 605. Reversing convictions on liquor violations
where a substantial part of the government's proof rested on intercepted
telephone conversations, the Court read section 605 to forbid tapping of
telephone messages. Further, the term "person" in the statute includes
federal agents, and the barring of communications to "any person" pre-
"By way of dicta earlier cases recognized a right of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment when searches were not physical. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Olmstead the
Court questioned whether the Fifth Amendment could be violated if the Fourth
were not, but dismissed the Fifth on the grounds that the monitored statements
were voluntary.
"The Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching.
There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
"Id. at 466-69.
19 d. at 469-70.
RId. at 473.
5148 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1962).
[Vol. 27,
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NOTES
cludes testimony in federal court of the evidence so obtained.52 The de-
fendants were reconvicted and the case was again appealed. In consid-
ering whether the lower court erred in refusing to allow the defendants
to examine the government about the uses it had made of wire-tap infor-
ination, the Court held that section 605 applies not only to such informa-
tion, but also to evidence obtained through knowledge gained from such
information.53 During the same term the Court also held that it is im-
possible to separate intrastate from interstate calls as they pass over the
wire, and that therefore section 605 prohibits both types of interception.
Also, consent of a conversant obtained by confronting him with record-
ings and promises of leniency is not "authorization of the sender" under
section 605. 51 In later tapping decisions, the Court found no need to re-
sort to the Fourth Amendment, as the statutory inhibition has been in-
terpreted to produce the same result. 55
The analogy of the exclusion of wire-tap evidence to evidence ob-
tainedby illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment was extended in Schwartz v. Texas56 where the Court refused to hold
that wire-tap evidence obtained by state officers was barred in state courts.
The case is similar to Wolf v. Colorado,5 7 later overruled by Mapp v. Ohio.5
It is submitted that if the privacy protected by section 605 is to be pro-
tected to the same extent as by the Fourth Amendment search and seiz-
ure provision, the path is clear for a ban in state courts of wire-tap
evidence illegally obtained by state officers. Of course, if eavesdropping
were placed within the Fourth Amendment, the Mapp v. Ohio exclusionary
rule would likely be extended to include surveillance.
New York, by constitutional provision and statute5 permits wire-
tapping if police first obtain a court order. Under this procedure, police
tapped the telephone of one Benanti, and what they heard led them to
believe a narcotics violation was about to take place. When arrested,
Benanti had, instead, some cans of untaxed alcohol in his possession.
Federal prosecution and conviction followed. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that state legislation would not be allowed to interfere
with the operation of section 605, thus striking down the "silver platter"
doctrine. Evidence obtained in violation of section 605, whether by state
or federal agents, is inadmissible in federal courts.60
While Benanti put more "bite" in section 605, Rathbun v. United
States"' limited the scope of the word "interception." Summoned by a
man who had received murder threats over the phone, police listened in
-302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
-308 U.S. 388 (1939).
'Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
"Note, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 632, 636 (1965).
-344 U.S. 199 (1952).
'Supra note 36.
'Supra note 36.
"N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1938); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813a.
'Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
-355 U.S. 107 (1957).
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on an extension when a second call with further threats was made. The
Court held section 605 inapplicable because there had been no intercep-
tion: "Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the
other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to
overhear the conversation. '62
Eavesdropping by Concealed Microphone After Olmstead
Since section 605 was meant to apply only to telephone or wire sur-
veillance, other forms of eavesdropping, until recently violated no fed-
eral law unless a trespass was committed or the Fourth Amendment
otherwise violated. A 1966 ruling of the Federal Communications Com-
mission forbids the use of radio devices for the purpose of eavesdrop-
ping. In cases after Olmstead, the Supreme Court employed anumber of
tests other than one of reasonableness. The primary test has continued to
be that of "trespass." In Goldman v. United States, federal agents made
an unauthorized entry in order to install a recorder, which failed to op-
erate. Despite this, the agents were able to obtain the desired evidence
by placing a listening device against the outer wall of defendant's room.
The Supreme Court affirmed conviction, holding that the initial trespass
had not tainted the subsequently acquired evidence procured without a
trespass.6 3 It was held in a companion case to Goldman that one not a
party to a tapped conversation has no standing to object when evidence
thus obtained is used against him.6 4 In On Lee v. United States, a federal
agent carrying a concealed transmitter entered defendant's laundry
where the latter made incriminating statements concerning narcotics.
The agent's testimony was admitted, and the Court affirmed, reasoning
that since the agent entered with the consent, if not implied invitation of
the defendant, that no trespass had been committed, and thus no violation
of the Fourth Amendment.6 5 In the Irvine v. California case, local police
installed a network of microphones in the defendant's home and over-
heard all conversations throughout the house. Relying on the definition
of interception used in Goldman, the Court held section 605 inapplicable:
"All that was heard through the microphone was what an eavesdropper,
hidden in the hall, the bedroom, or the closet, might have heard." 66
A new test was announced in Silverman v. United States6 7 where po-
lice pushed a "spike mike" through a party wall of an adjoining house
until it touched the heating duct in defendant's house, thus converting
the entire heating system into a conductor of sound. Defendants were
"Id. at 111.
-316 U.S. 129 (1942). Section 605 of the Communications Act was held inapplicable
on the theory that overhearing one end of a telephonic conversation is not an inter-
ception. The Court's opinion, however, suggested that the Fourth Amendment would
be violated if the installer trespassed or the surveillance device was placed within
the premises.
'Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
-343 U.S. 747, 751-2 (1952).
-347 U.S. 128, 131 (1953).
-365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
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convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed, based on testimony that
the microphone did not penetrate more than five-sixteenths of an inch.68
In an unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed, refusing to base
their reasoning on the technicality of trespass, but upon the reality of an
actual intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area" under the Fourth
Amendment.6 9 The new test was further defined in 1962, when it was
argued that the monitoring of a jail cell conversation was a violation
under the test. Although the Court rejected the petition, it broadened
by way of dicta the area to be protected to include an apartment and
hotel room, and in some cases, a store or business office. 70
The chief problem in the application of the "area" test is that of de-
fining the area, and at what times the test is applicable. Obviously there
can be no eavesdropping when a confidential relationship is involved,
such as attorney and client. Freedom of the individual may be restricted
because of the uncertainty as to when the line is crossed from one area to
another.7'1 In adding the "area" test to the older "trespass' test the
Court did not explain whether the two were exclusive, or whether there
must be a violation of both before privacy is infringed. However, the
Lanza case did make it clear that electronic surveillance could constitute
an unreasonable search and seizure, hence could violate constitutional
rights, thus going beyond the superficial rationale of trespass to recog-
nize individual privacy.72
Lopez v. United States was based on facts similar to On Lee: A gov-
ernment agent carrying a concealed transmitter entering defendant's
premises.7 3 The Court affirmed conviction, relying heavily on the pres-
ence of the agent who heard the incriminating evidence, to which he
could testify. However, three dissenters argued that defendant's rights
had been violated, but even more important, the dissenters d~monstrated
an increased awareness of the problems presented by electronic surveil-
lance, which permits "a degree of invasion of privacy that can only be
described as frightening. 7 4 Further, the considerations underlying the
Fourth Amendment have been too often ignored. Lopez indicates that
deeper analysis and fresh approaches may be found soon.
Olmstead may no longer be valid law. In a recent search and seizure
case, the Court held that incriminating statements could be illegally
"seized. '7 5 Since the Olmstead rationale was that eavesdropping was not
within the Fourth Amendment because conversation was intangible and
therefore incapable of seizure, the way now seems clear for overruling
Olmstead and its successor cases,' 6 and utilizing the Fourth Amendment
6166 F. Supp. 838 (D. D.C. 1958).
-365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
"Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
"See King, supra note 38, at 255.
"Id. at 257.
"Supra note 38.
71Id. at 468.
"Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
"Goldman, supra note 63; On Lee, supra note 65.
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to restrict electronic surveillance. The downfall of Olmstead was fore-
shadowed by Silverman, which added the "area" test.77
Use of Radio Banned
Most eavesdropping occurs in one of three situations, depending on
the location of the parties and the equipment used: (1) where two or
more persons at different locations are conversing by telephone or other
means of wire communication, and the wire is tapped--section 605 pro-
hibits interception and divulgence of this type of communication; (2)
where two or more persons are conversing in the same room, and their
words are picked up by concealed microphone and relayed by radio trans-
mitter to a monitor and recorder; (3) where persons are together and
their conversation is picked up by microphone and carried by wire to the
recorder or monitor.
A very recent ruling by the F. C. C. prohibits the use of any radio
device in connection with eavesdropping. 78 Therefore, surveillance in
the second situation is now forbidden.7 9 However, there is no federal
law which prohibits eavesdropping in the third situati6n, where the over-
heard words are relayed by wire to listener or recorder The new ruling,
which became effective April 8, 1966, reveals an increased awareness of
the problems posed by modern eavesdropping. Contrary to previously
developed case law, there is no exception where one party consents. The
Commission felt that the ordinary risk of being overheard is converted
into an entirely different risk when the electronic device is the instru-
ment used by the intruder. Although the distinction is valid, its appli-
cation may unreasonably restrict common business practices.8 0
Also, the new ruling does not apply to law enforcement officers
acting under lawful authority.8s Although section 605 contained no such
exception, one was developed of necessity through case law and state
statute, notably that of New York. However, the new rule allows police
to eavesdrop in connection with any crime, unless a restriction is im-
posed by local law. Experience has shown that unrestricted police surveil-
lance is undesirable-a better approach would restrict such activity to
serious crimes. Only private conversations are protected under the new
ruling. If a conversation is conducted within earshot of other persons,
or in a public place, the monitoring of the conversation is not unlawful.82
T7 For an excellent analysis of the ramifications of the Wong Sun case, see Broeder,
Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483 (1963).
"31 Fed. Reg. 3397 (1966).
"The prohibition applies also to indirect use of radio devices, i.e., even where a con-
versation is picked up initially by a non-radio device. "Thus, irrespective of the
combination of devices employed by the eavesdropper to accomplish his objective,
the proposed rules will apply if any one of the combination is a radio device."
31 Fed. Reg. 3397, 3399 (1966).
81It has become a common practice for a business associate to listen in on a conversa-
tion or for a secretary to take shorthand notes of a conversation.
"1The burden of establishing that radio eavesdropping activities are being conducted
under lawful authority rests with the law enforcement agency.
'
2The Commission notes that where protective or beneficial monitoring is desired, the
public' could be given notice that the area is under surveillance. Thus, persons con-
[Vol. 27,
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Enforcement of the rule will be troublesome. It is difficult to ap-
prehend the eavesdropper while he is actually monitoring a conversation.
Usually, eavesdropping statutes are enforced when such information is
introduced into court or brought before the judiciary. However, at this
stage, there is no way of determining whether the overheard words were
transmitted from the microphone to the recorder by wire or by means of
radio device. The eavesdropper will, of course, assert vigorously that
wire was used. In the face of such a problem, the courts will be forced to
fall back on Constitutional considerations and the yet undeveloped right
of privacy. This would seem to be the only serious defect of the new
ruling. Unfortunately, the F. C. C. lacks the authority to extend the
prohibition to the third situation-eavesdropping, with wire transmission.
The new rule, like section 605, will be very difficult to enforce against
the states.
The Inadequacy of Current Restrictions on Eavesdropping
The approach of the judiciary to electronic surveillance has been
criticized as rigid and over-reliant on precedent.83 Purely tangible consid-
erations have been emphasized, which ignore the underlying spirit and
basis of constitutional protections. Instead of setting up boundaries
around such concepts by determining invasions on actual physical pene-
tration, the courts should have been considering the basic liberty in-
volved. The fallacy of the frequently drawn analogy to search and seiz-
ure is that electronic eavesdropping is much more pervasive than any
physical search, and capable of much deeper penetration into the indi-
vidual's existence. Further, eavesdropping will pick up incriminating
statements made by a person not aware he is under surveillance, while
the same statements would never be uttered during the course of a physi-
cal search. 84 Also, what is "seized" by surveillance is words and ideas,
the freedom of thought and expression. These intangibles have long been
recognized by the courts as more important than tangible items.
Further, reliance on precedent is not realistic in light of modern de-
velopments. Testimony of eavesdroppers was allowed as evidence at
common law, but reliance on the common law is inadequate in a dynamic
area such as electronic surveillance. Previously one could guard against
the risk of being overheard, which is no longer true. Now only a
specially constructed room can guarantee protection.8 5
Constitutional control of eavesdropping, through the Fourth Amend-
mend, is also unsatisfactory. Questions which would have to be an-
swered include a determination of what eavesdropping is reasonable, and
on what conditions authorized surveillance should be permitted, if at all.
The Fourth Amendment requires that the things seized be described with
versing in the area would have consented by implication. Failure to give adequate
notice would result in an actionable invasion of privacy.
'King, supra note 38, at 262.
"id. at 264.
1DASH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 358.
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particularity which is very difficult with such far-reaching devices as
are now in use. Also, the amendment requires that items of evidentiary
value only be seized. Although this has been construed to include many
other things, it is difficult to see how the scope of eavesdropping could
be limited so as to satisfy the wording of the amendment. 86
The exclusion anomaly aggravates the problem: illegally obtained
wire-tap evidence is admitted in state court and excluded in federal court
no matter who obtains it-yet tangible evidence illegally seized is ex-
cluded in all courts. Eavesdropping by concealed microphone with wire
transmission to the recorder remains uncontrolled, except in the few
cases where the victim can prove a trespass was committed. In an at-
tempt to correct the problem, numerous congressional investigations have
been conducted, and eavesdropping bills introduced, none of which has
passed.
State Law
State law has also failed to keep pace with scientific advances. The
majority of states have enacted statutes to control wire-tapping, but un-
fortunately many of these only forbid injury to telephone wire or inter-
ference with telephone service. A few attempts to bring wire-tapping
under these statutes failed because there was no damage to wires or
interference with service. It is unlikely that these statutes will ever be
effective since tapping by induction requires no touching of the wires and
is virtually undetectable.87 On the whole, state legislation can not cope
with the methods now in use. Few states have attempted to control
eavesdropping other than wire-tapping. Authorized tapping is allowed
in twenty eight states, some of which detail the authority required, while
others leave the job to the courts.8 8 Aside from the legality of tapping,
the question of admissibility has received less attention. Four state
supreme courts hold such evidence admissible, while one state excludes
it. Of the seven state statutes dealing with admissibility, four prohibit,
and three admit wire-tap information as evidence. 9
The Revised Codes of Montana contain four statutes pertinent to the
subject.90 Three of the statutes deal only with telegraphic communica-
" A listening to all talk inside a house has only one purpose-evidence gathering. No
valid warrant for such listening or for the installation of a dictaphone could be
issued. Such conduct is lawless, an unconstitutional violation of the owner's
privacy." United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 317 (2nd Cir. 1951) (Frank, J.,
dissenting).
"For a discussion of state law, see Westin, supra note 15, at 181-86.
OFor a list of the states, see Kent, supra note 13, at 308 n. 106. Seven states have
adopted statutes which prohibit electronic eavesdropping. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
653(j); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-1 (Smith-Hurd 1941); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27
and 125 (a) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1956); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.650 (1957); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 738; and ORE. REV. STAT. § 165-540(1) (c) (1965).
reStates holding such evidence inadmissible: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.3 (1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-35-13 (1956);
TEx. PEN. CODE art. 727a (1948). Admitting such information as evidence: MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, § 97 (1957); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200-680 (1959); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 41.910 (1959).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-3321 and 94-3322 prohibit the disclosure or alternation of the
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tions. The fourth, section 94-3203 provides a penalty for tapping or
making any connection with a telephone or telegraph line by any means.
The violation must be wilfull and malicious, and applies to every person,
thereby apparently not excluding law enforcement officers. There is no
Montana statute dealing with other forms of eavesdropping. Nor are
there decisions dealing with other forms of eavesdropping. In a recent
Oklahoma case the court interpreted a statute nearly identical to that of
l'ontana's so as to forbid wire-tapping, and even more importantly,
focused consideration on the protection of privacy.9 1 The Montana
statute could be interpreted in like manner.
PROPOSED STATUTES
,Section 1. Eavesdropping.
(a) Except as provided in this section, a person:
(1) not present during a private conversation, who by means of
instrument, surreptitiously overhears, amplifies, or records such
conversation, or attempts to do so, or aids, authorizes, employs,
procures, or permits another to do so, or(2) not a sender or receiver of a telephone, telegraph, or other
wire communication, who by means of instrument, overhears, am-
plifies, or records such communication, or attempts to do so, or
aids, authorizes, employs, procures or permits another to do so,
is guilty of eavesdropping. Unlawful eavesdropping shall be a mis-
demeanor punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or
by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or both such fine and
imprisonment.
(b) Exceptions: Eavesdropping as defined in section (a) will not
be unlawful if:
(1) the consent of one party to the conversation is obtained, or
(2) conducted in a place of business, or on business premises,
with the consent of the business owner, or other person having
lawful or primary right to possession,
and if the eavesdropping conducted under either of these subsec-
tions is not an unreasonable infringement of individual privacy.
(3) the person eavesdropping is a law enforcement officer acting
under authority of a court order described in section two of this
chapter.
(c) The term "person" includes an individual, business association,
partnership, corporation, or other legal entity, and an individual act-
ing or purporting to act for or on behalf of any government or sub-
division thereof.
(d) "Instrument" means any device designated or used for acous-
tical detection, including but not limited to wire-tapping equipment,
microphones, detectaphones, 'spike mikes,' distaphones, radio trans-
mitters and recorders.
(e) This section does not apply to the use of hearing aids and simi-
lar devices, by persons afflicted with impaired hearing, for the pur-
pose of overcoming the impairment to permit the hearing of sounds
ordinarily audible to the human ear.
contents of a telegraphic message without the consent of the addressee or court order.
R.C.M. 1947, § 94-35-220 prohibits the learning of the contents of a telegraphic
message by machine, instrument, contrivance, or in any other manner. The first two
sections were apparently intended to apply to agents and employees of the telegraph
company. The third could be interpreted so as to prevent not only wire-tapping by
connection, but also by -induction. All three sections, however, apply only to tele-
graphic communications.
"Two Oklahoma statutes, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1757, 1782, which are very
similar to R.C.M. 1947, § 94-3203, have been interpreted to prohibit wire-tapping
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(f) This section does not apply to employees or agents of a public
utility engaged in the business of providing communication services
and facilities when acting within the scope of their employment and
by order of their superiors for the purpose of construction, mainten-
ance or operation.
The section is similar to the Keating Bill92 and parts of the Califor-
nia Penal Code. 93 The primary defect in section 605 is eliminated. Inter-
ception or its attempt is alone sufficient to violate the law. There is no
requirement of publication, use, or divulgence. The section restricts both
wire-tapping and other forms of eavesdropping. Section 605 and most
existing statutes only restrict wire-tapping. It is absolutely essential
that surveillance by concealed microphone be controlled, as it poses the
greatest threat to privacy. Wire-tapping is ostensibly controlled by
section 605.
Only conversations intended to be private are given protection.
Obviously when a discussion is conducted in a public place under cir-
cumstances which reasonably indicate that the participants do not desire
it to be confined, privacy cannot be expected. Nor does the protection
extend to a situation where an individual is known by the parties to be
overhearing or recording their conversation. The eavesdropping must
be surreptitious, unknown to both parties, and without the consent of
either.
By use of the word "instrument", the section defines eavesdropping
so that information obtainable by use of norman human senses is ex-
cluded. Only surveillance which enables the eavesdropper to monitor
sounds beyond the range of the human ear is restricted. It is felt that
persons conducting a conversation can easily take reasonable precau-
tions to prevent overhearing by non-electronic means.94
The first two exceptions, with consent or on business premises, are
subject to a requirement of reasonableness. Examples of otherwise lawful
eavesdropping which might be held unreasonable, and thus prohibited,
are: (1) surveillance devices placed in a public bathroom in a business
establishment; (2) installation of surveillance equipment in the bedroom
of a house, even though one party's consent has been secured; (3) the
over-hearing of certain highly personal or confidential matters such as
those of a marital or financial nature, even though the monitored conver-
sation is conducted on business premises, or elsewhere with the consent
by "connection" or "physical interruption" without the consent of both parties
to the conversation and the telephone company. See Cameron v. State, 365 P.2d
576 (Okla. 1961). According to that court, the purpose of the statutes is protection
of privacy, although wire-tapping was held not to constitute a seizure within the
Oklahoma constitutional provision identical to the Fourth Amendment. Where no
illegal interception occurs, one party's consent, either express or implied, would
render lawful the overhearing or recording of the conversation. Further, evidence
obtained by illegal interception is inadmissible in court, but would be admitted if
authorized by court order, or obtained by a law enforcement officer in the discharge
of his duties.
91S. 1221, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). A thorough analysis of the bill may be found
in Kent, supra note 13, at 320 et. seq.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 653(j).
"King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional Rights, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 240,
263-64 (1964).
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of a participant. The police exception, subsection three, is also subject
to a standard of reasonableness. Law enforcement eavesdropping re-
quires a court order, and the judiciary, in considering applications to
eavesdrop, would prevent any unreasonable invasions of privacy, taking
into consideration the crime involved.
The statute provides for legalized surveillance if the consent of one
party to the conversation is obtained. A citizen's privacy is not unduly
jeopardized if those persons to whom he voluntarily speaks arc per-
mitted to monitor or record his conversations, subject to the reasonable-
ness criterion.95 The majority of courts and legislators feel that the right
of privacy does not extend to a situation where a participant has con-
sented to have the discussion monitored.9 6 Except in the case of a privi-
leged communication, standard rules of evidence support this position.
Evidence law allows a participant to testify, and in some instances, com-
pels such testimony. 7 Outside of court, a party to a discussion may nor-
mally repeat it to anyone without fear of legal liability. A person is
bound at his peril to evaluate the reliability of those whom he engages
in conversation.
The private investigator may still function under the statute, by
operating within the first two exceptions. The potential for legitimate
business use of eavesdropping is very great, and there are numerous
instances where needed information can lawfully be obtained as a party
to the conversation, or with the consent of a party."8
Section 2. Court Order Authorizing Eavesdropping.
A Montana court of record may issue an order authorizing eaves-
dropping by law enforcement officers upon a showing that:
(1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime directly
or immediately affecting the safety of human life has been com-
mitted or is about to be committed; and(2) there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be
obtained essential to the solution of such crime, or which may en-
able the prevention of such crime; and(3) there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
information.
The application for such order shall be made upon oath or affirma-
tion, setting forth fully the facts and circumstances upon which such
application is based. Where statements are solely upon the informa-
tion and belief of the affiant, the precise source of such information
and the grounds for such belief must be given. The affiant must
state whether any prior applications have been made to eavesdrop
9 Telephone companies, in compliance with an order of the F.C.C., require that a beep
signal be used when telephone conversations are recorded, but this provision is largely
ignored. Consent of a subscriber who is not a party to the conversation is not
sufficient to legalize eavesdropping on the subscriber's phone. Only a participant
to the conversation can give the necessary consent.
mDASH, op. cit. supra note 2, 423-24.
"
7See generally, MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 502 et. seq. (1954).
"The proposed statute is contrary to section 605. Law enforcement officers are not
permitted to tap under court interpretation of section 605, although both California
and New York so provide by statute. The result is that evidence obtained in such a
manner would be inadmissible in federal court. The exclusionary rule has not thus
far been applied to state courts. This may soon occur by way of a court holding
putting eavesdropping within the Fourth Amendment. Then Mapp v. Ohio would be
extended.
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from the same person, and, if such prior applications exist, the
affiant shall disclose the current status thereof. The application and
any order issued under this section shall identify the telephone or
telegraph line, or other communications carrier from which informa-
tion is to be obtained, the persons whose conversation is to be sub-jected to eavesdropping, and the purpose thereof. The court shall
examine upon oath and affirmation the applicant and any witnesses
he shall produce or the court may require.
Orders issued under this section shall not be effective for a
period longer than sixty days, after which the court may, in its dis-
cretion, renew such order.
Upon the completion of eavesdropping authorized by section
1(b)(3) and this section, any tape or wire recordings or other evi-
dence of a permanent nature will be promptly returned to the court
which issued the order, with an affidavit showing where such re-
cordings were obtained, and that the recordings have not been
altered in any way.
This section is modelled upon the current New York statute,"" a bill
developed by a Senate committee which conducted an investigation of
wire-tapping, 100 and recommendations of a grand jury.101 Assuming that
the need for law enforcement surveillance can be shown, it is appropriate
to consider schemes of regulation and the type of crimes in which eaves-
dropping will be permitted. Because surveillance necessarily involves a
serious invasion of privacy, the practice should be confined to major
offenses, or cases involving the safety of human life. With such a broad
definition, the judiciary will be able to determine which cases should
properly fall therein. A sense of proportion demands that the areas in
which eavesdropping is permitted be limited, and human life is a reason-
able dividing line. The criterion suggested is not as restrictive as might
appear, since in many types of crimes, such as grand larceny, blackmail,
or espionage, police could eavesdrop under either of the other two ex-
ceptions, that is, with the consent of a party, or on business premises.
The use of eavesdropping in vice cases is unwarranted for two reasons:
(1) there is no real need because these crimes depend on public patron-
age, and therefore a large number of people have knowledge of the
offense 1 °2 -evidence is thus more easily obtainable from other sources;
(2) the opportunity for blackmail, bribery, extortion, and other forms
of corruption is often too great for police to resist.
Judicial supervision is more effective than administrative super-
vision. Because in most cases an order would have to be obtained with-
out delay, administration by the attorney general is obviously imprac-
tical, considering the size of Montana. Also, the close relation of both the
attorney general and the county attorneys to enforcement agencies might
not insure impartial scrutiny of applications, which commends the court
system. In Montana, where there are fewer judges, there will be less
opportunity for "judge shopping" and a resulting loosening of stand-
PIN.Y. CODE CaIM. PROC. § 813(a).
'IS. 4154, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950).
'Kings County Grand Jury. For text, see N.Y. Times, December 28, 1950, p. 19, col 1.
See also Westin, supra note 15, at 203 et. seq.
""' I think it would be safe to say that the dogs in the street know-at least in the
city of New York-who the bookmakers are." Keating, testifying before House
Judiciary Committee in 1955, reported in MINN. L. Rnv., supra note 2, at 823.
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ards. By requiring a complete statement, and allowing the issuing court
discretion, more than a ministerial function is involved. The judiciary
will be enabled to prevent any unjustifiable invasions of privacy through
the exercise of firm supervisory control.
The order is effective for only sixty days. Any officer seeking re-
newal would be required to follow the same procedure used to obtain the
initial order. Any officer who knowingly proceeded under an order which
had expired and had not been renewed would be subject to the same
penalties as if the order had never been obtained.103
The procedure for obtaining a court order is detailed, and among
other things, requires "reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will
be obtained," that the person whose conversation is to be monitored be
fully identified, and that all pertinent facts be stated. These require-
ments have three virtues: (1) there is less opportunity for police abuse
of the system; (2) maximum protection is given to privacy; and (3) the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied to the fullest extent
possible.
Science has made possible the editing of tape recordings so that
words may be added, deleted, or altered, making possible a complete
transformation in what was actually said. This may be done without
detection. 10 4 In view of this, a reasonable safeguard would require im-
mediate return to the issuing judge of all tapes, along with an affidavit
that no alterations had been made. A heavy penalty should be imposed
for any violation of this provision.
Section 3. Evidence Obtained in Violation of This Chapter.
Except as proof in a prosecution for violation of this chapter, no evi-
dence obtained in violation of this chapter shall be admissible in anyjudicial, administrative, legislative or other proceeding.
The section is modelled on a California statute. 10 5 Criminal sanctions
alone are inadequate to prevent illegal eavesdropping. If information
illegally obtained is excluded as evidence, most of the incentive is re-
moved. If further restriction is desired, courts may exclude also the
fruits of illegally obtained information. In addition to the penal and
exclusionary sanctions, the eavesdropper should be liable in tort for
damages caused by the invasion of the victim's privacy. Minimum dam-
ages should be presumed in such an action. More could be recovered
upon proof. Injunctions are ineffective against surveillance, since in
most cases the victim is not aware of the eavesdropping. By the time it
is discovered, and an injunction obtained, the damage is already done.
' New York provides that officers may eavesdrop without an order when it is impera-
tive to commence surveillance immediately, and then apply for an order within
twenty four hours. This procedure seems unnecessary since the time required to
determine where the surveillance is to be conducted and then installation of the
equipment should allow ample opportunity in which to obtain an order. Also, a
problem arises when police tap, and the subsequent application for an order is
denied.
10
'DASH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 367-71.
'
2
'CAL. PEN. CODE § 653 (j).
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It would be desirable to require telephone companies and the courts
issuing surveillance orders to compile statistics. Any data which would
indicate the extent of electronic surveillance would be helpful in deter-
mining what further controls are needed.
Section 4. Eavesdropping Prohibited-When.
Eavesdropping shall be prohibited by law enforcement officers or
other public agents on a person in custody or on the premises of the
public agent when the conversation is with his attorney, religious
adviser, or licensed physician.
This section is similar to that of California.10 6 Notwithstanding the
exceptions permitted by section one, no surveillance will be permitted of
"privileged" conversations, without the consent of all parties.
Section 5. Possession of Eavesdropping Equipment.
A person who has in his possession any eavesdropping instrument or
equipment under circumstances evincing an intent to use or employ
or allow the same to be used or employed for unlawful purposes
under this chapter, or knowing the same to be so used, shall be fined
not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than
six months, or both.
This provision is similar to New York's penal law and is necessary
because of the extreme difficulty of apprehending the eavesdropper in
the act of conducting illegal surveillance. 10 7 Possession alone is not an
offense. Circumstances must indicate an intent by the possessor to use
such equipment for unlawful surveillance.
CONCLUSION
A society which values the individual's right of privacy will not
tolerate unrestricted surveillance. Eavesdropping is an affront to per-
sonal dignity and inhibits individual action and expression. Because
electronic surveillance is pervasive and indiscriminate, the unsuspecting
victim is particularly vulnerable. Controls must be imposed which will
keep pace with the rapid development of sophisticated electronic devices.
Experience has demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining adequate legisla-
tion at the federal level. Nor is a satisfactory remedy found in the Con-
stitution, for eavesdropping does not fall comfortably within the pro-
scriptions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The individual states
are in a much better position to control surveillance. But even when such
controls are adopted at the state level, there is a remaining problem of
enforcement. The needs of law enforcers and businessmen can be met
if legitimate surveillance based on a standard of reasonableness is per-
mitted. The exclusionary rule and firm judicial supervision will curb
abuses. Heavy penalties for wrongful eavesdropping, or for possession
of surveillance equipment with an intent to eavesdrop, will prevent
blackmail and other criminal activities. Adoption of the statutory con-
trols suggested, and their enforcement by an informed judiciary will
adequately preserve the privacy of individual communication.
GARY L. DAVIS.
101d.
'-'N.Y. CODR CRIM. PROC. § 552 (a).
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